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Abstract
After decades of successful growth, economic unions have recently become the fo-
cus of heightened political controversy. We argue that this is partly due to the growth
of trade between countries that are increasingly dissimilar. We develop a theoretical
framework to study the e¤ects on trade, income distribution and welfare of economic
unions that di¤er in size and scope. Our model shows that political support for inter-
national unions can grow with their breadth and depth as long as member countries
are su¢ ciently similar. However, di¤erences in economic size and factor endowments
can trigger disagreement over the value of unions between and within countries. The
model is consistent with some salient features of the process of European integration
and statistical evidence from survey data.
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1 Introduction
The development of global markets increasingly relies on international institutions providing
common regulation to reduce or remove non-tari¤barriers that hamper trade across national
borders. The growing importance of these non-tari¤ barriers reects, on the one hand, the
decline of more obvious costs of international trade: progress in transportation and commu-
nication technology has steadily reduced shipping costs, while multilateral and regional trade
agreements have brought tari¤s down to an all-time low of 3% on average.1 On the other
hand, regulatory harmonization has become more important with the increasing complexity
of world trade. Recent decades have witnessed the growth of trade in tasks, with di¤erent
stages of production located in di¤erent countries along global value chains. In the future,
growth in international trade must increasingly lie in the service sector. Its importance is
steadily growing, and it already accounts for almost two thirds of world output; yet it only
accounts for less than a quarter of world trade, in part because many services especially
professional and nancial services are bound by distinct national regulations.2
The need for common policies to enable market integration and reap the gains from trade
has led to the creation of international economic unions. Europe has been at the forefront
of this institutional development. Establishing a common market was the core objective of
the European Economic Community at its founding in 1957. Over the following six decades,
what is now the European Union has grown from 6 to 28 member states, while steadily
deepening economic integration and regulatory harmonization in its Single Market. Yet
economic unions are far from an exclusively European phenomenon; on the contrary, they
are found on every continent.3 Moreover, recent trade agreements such as the European
UnionJapan Economic Partnership Agreement have increasingly emphasized regulatory co-
operation, common standards and impartial enforcement procedures for the protection of
1The world average of e¤ectively applied tari¤ rates, weighted by the product import shares corresponding
to each partner country, was 2.59% in 2017, as reported by the World Development Indicators.
2Over the decade to 2016, the share of services in world value added grew from 62% to 65%, as reported
by the World Development Indicators. Developed countries had a similar pattern of growth (e.g., 74% to
77% for the US and 64% to 66% for the EU) and developing countries a steeper one (e.g., 43% to 52% for
China). In 2016, the share of services in international trade was 23% on average, with higher gures for
developed countries (e.g., 26% for the US and 29% for the EU, including intra-EU trade) and lower ones for
developing countries (e.g., 16% for China).
3International economic unions, with varying levels of economic integration and institutional success,
include the Caribbean Single Market (CARICOM), the Central American Common Market (SICA), and the
Southern Common Market (Mercosur); the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)
and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); the Eurasian Economic Union, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, and the ASEAN Economic Community.
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Benefit from EU Membership
Benefited Not benefited Don't know
Figure 1: Perceived benets from EU membership. Shares of responses to the question:
Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance
beneted or not from being a member of the European Union?Source: Eurobarometer.
investors and intellectual-property owners.
After decades of successful growth, however, economic unions have become the focus
of heightened political controversy over the past few years. After the election of President
Trump in 2016, the United States abandoned both the Trans-Pacic Partnership and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Also in 2016, the United Kingdom voted
in a referendum to leave the European Union. Euro-skepticism appears on the rise more
broadly, and plans for the enlargement of the euro area are e¤ectively on hold.
These setbacks do not mean that international institution are now facing a universal
backlash, just as they did not previously enjoy universal support. Yet, they have become
increasingly polarizing. Both President Trump and Brexit won narrow and bitterly divisive
victories at the polls. Eurobarometer surveys show that the share of European citizens who
perceive net benets of European Union membership has remained quite steady over the
decades; however, the share who perceive net costs has been gradually catching up, as the
share of undecided respondents fell (Figure 1).
Preference polarization over international economic integration is naturally linked to the
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changing nature of international trade. Throughout the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the bulk of world trade was taking place between similar countries. Likewise, economic
unions initially included countries with comparable levels of income and factor endowments.
A key feature of this type of economic integration is that it does not imply the realloca-
tion of resources predicted by conventional models of trade driven by di¤erences in factor
endowments. Accordingly, one of the original motivations for developing models of trade
in di¤erentiated varieties was the need to account for episodes such as the creation of the
European Economic Community, in which trade liberalization had faced little political op-
position because it had led to rises in real income for owners of all factors in all member
states (Helpman and Krugman 1985). Yet, the enlargements of the European Union to the
East, trade liberalization in developing countries and the rise of China in global markets
have brought distributional consideration to the forefront. As a result, many now fear that
the negative consequences of import competition can overshadow the benets of market size.
To shed light on these phenomena, in this paper we develop a theoretical framework to
study the e¤ects on trade, income distribution and welfare of economic unions that di¤er in
size and scope. We then apply our model to interpret the process of European integration.
Section 2 presents the basic setup of our theory. It considers a multi-country, multi-industry
and multi-factor framework that combines the Krugman model of trade and monopolistic
competition with the Ricardo-Viner model of specic factors. In particular, countries produce
di¤erentiated varieties in a continuum of industries employing sector-specic human capital.
They di¤er both in size and in the distribution of their factor endowments across sectors.
These di¤erences entail potential gains from both intra-industry and inter-industry trade.
In Section 3, we add to our framework a theory of border costs. We assume that in some
industries trade is possible only in the presence of union policies that overcome non-tari¤
barriers. For instance, common regulations or standards are often needed for rms to sell
their products in foreign markets, especially in certain sectors such as nancial services. We
explicitly recognize that all economic unions are not the same. In particular, unions vary
in their depth, i.e., the measure of industries covered by union policies; and their breadth,
i.e., the set of countries included in the union. We study how these aspects of the union
determine its impact on the world distribution of income and welfare.
In Section 4, we determine the sources of political support for specic economic unions
and derive predictions on how this political support varies across countries, and how it reacts
to changes in the depth and breadth of the union. We nd that some of the e¤ects of union
policies are homogeneous within each country because they reect changes in prices that
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accrue entirely to consumers. This is the case for the benets of increased variety that result
from intra-industry trade. Inter-industry trade also yields consumer benets, but in addition
it has distributive consequences across workers in the same country. Workers in exporting
industries reap an extra gain from accessing foreign markets, while workers in importing
industries lose from the entry of foreign competitors into their home market. The model
paints a rich and realistic picture, which yields the following main results.
If union members are su¢ ciently similar, there is no disagreement either between or
within countries. Support for the union unanimously increases with the size and scope of
the union. The intuition for this result is simply that the value of trade-promoting policies
increases with the number of potential trading partners and the industries they cover.
However, disagreement over the value of unions arises if countries di¤er in size, income
and endowments. Di¤erences in economic size introduce disagreement over the value of the
union between countries, as the benet from the access to the larger union market is higher for
small and poor countries. Comparative advantage due to di¤erences in relative endowments
introduces instead disagreement over the union within countries. Workers in comparative-
advantage industries support the union because they stand to benet as exporters. Workers
in comparative-disadvantage industries benet from lower prices, but experience a fall in their
income due to import competition from other countries in the union. Hence, the e¤ect of
comparative advantage on the support for market integration is nuanced. On the one hand,
inter-industry trade increases the value the union. On the other hand, it also generates
winners and losers. Various scenarios may arise. For instance, adding dissimilar countries
can weaken the support for the union, even when more market integration is benecial for all
countries as a whole. The reason is that, while winners gain more from such an enlargement,
the number of sectors and workers threatened by import competition increases.
Section 5 discusses how our theory helps interpret the history of European integration.
In the twentieth century, the European Union steadily grew in size up to 15 members, while
constantly deepening market integration and enjoying broad political support. This pattern
is consistent with our prediction that economic unions can grow without triggering opposition
when their members are not too dissimilar. In the twenty-rst century, however, enlargement
has brought into the European Union countries that are smaller, poorer and have a di¤erent
mix of factor endowments. In keeping with our theory, this has led to growing political
tensions and discontent among losers in larger, richer countries. We provide new statistical
evidence that measures of economic size and exposure to import competition from other
European Union countries correlate with survey data on attitudes towards the union precisely
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as predicted by our model. In particular, rich and large countries tend to have a more
negative image of the European Union. Moreover, support for the European Union is weaker
in countries with a larger share of workers employed in comparative-disadvantage sectors;
nally, this share has increased in many member countries after the 2004-06 enlargements.
Related literature There is a large literature on international and regional trade agree-
ments: Freund and Ornelas (2010), Maggi (2014, 2016), Grossman (2016) and Bagwell and
Steiger (2016) provide excellent surveys. This literature considers international agreements
as coordination and commitment devices to prevent the escalation of negative externalities
generated by trade policy and to protect governments from the inuence of domestic pres-
sure groups. It has studied the design of rules for achieving these goals, and the merits of
multilateral relative to regional negotiations. In contrast, we study the e¤ect of unions at
eliminating non-tari¤ barriers to trade and removing the undesirable border e¤ect that
these barriers produce. Our focus is on the heterogeneous costs and benets of these poli-
cies. We abstract from coordination and commitment problems, which have been studied
extensively. A recent paper that also examines non-tari¤ barriers, but focuses instead on
coordination problems in the adoption of product standards, is that of Grossman, McCalman
and Staiger (2019).
Our paper is also related to the literature on the size of trade-promoting international
unions. Several papers build on the insight from theories of federalism (Oates 1972) that
unions, like centralized jurisdictions, reap the benets of coordination and market integra-
tion, but at the cost of imposing uniform policies on members with di¤erent preferences
(Bolton and Roland 1996, 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg
2000; Casella 2001; Casella and Feinstein 2002; Alesina, Angeloni and Etro 2005; Gancia,
Ponzetto and Ventura 2018). These papers have studied how the size of jurisdictions changes
with exogenous changes in the costs of trade. In contrast, we study the e¤ect of unions that
vary in size and scope on countries that di¤er in size, productivity and factor endowments.
In this respect, our model is also related to a small set of papers studying asymmetric unions
(Harstad 2006; Berglof et al. 2008, 2012). This literature has however focused on a di¤erent
question, namely, whether the possibility of forming inner clubs is desirable and/or can
sustain more cooperation in the presence of externalities.
Finally, there is a new but fast-growing literature on the recent backlash against globaliza-
tion. There is evidence that voters exposed to import competition become more protectionist
(Feigenbaum and Hall 2015), and that the opposition of import-exposed workers to interna-
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tional economic integration was one of the economic drivers of support for Brexit (Becker,
Fetzer and Novy 2017; Colantone and Stanig 2018a). More broadly, a series of recent papers
have investigated empirically the connection of import competition with economic nation-
alism and political extremism (Che et al. 2016; Autor et al. 2017; Colantone and Stanig
2018b). Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015) and Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth (2017) have
shown that, just as import competition is positively linked to anti-establishment politics,
export opportunities have the opposite political e¤ect.
From a theoretical perspective, political opposition to globalization has been associated
mostly to a rise in inequality (Grossman and Helpman 2019; Pastor and Veronesi 2019). In
this paper, we also consider inequality, but we shows how it interacts with other factors giving
rise to a rich set of results. Interestingly, Buera, Monge-Naranjo and Primiceri (2011) warned
that, in a model with uncertainty and learning, a large economic shock could trigger a reversal
against market-oriented policies. We instead abstract from issues related to information
frictions. While all the papers in this literature study unilateral policy choices, we focus on
political support for existing international unions.
2 A model of international trade with border costs
This section develops a multi-country, multi-industry and multi-factor framework that com-
bines the Krugman model of trade and monopolistic competition with the Ricardo-Viner
model of specic factors. Each industry contains a continuum of monopolistic competi-
tors producing di¤erentiated products and earning zero prots. Labor is the only factor of
production; but there are many di¤erent types of labor, one for each industry.
As usual, country borders a¤ect trade. In labor markets, border costs are prohibitive
and producers hire domestic labor only. Thus, there is a local labor market for each country
and labor type. In product markets, border costs vary across industries and country pairs.
Thus, some product markets are local, some are global, and some are somewhere in between.
2.1 Economic environment
We consider a world with a discrete set of countries: N = f1; 2; :::; Ng with typical element
n 2 N . Residents of all countries consume products from and work in a continuum of indus-
tries: I = [0; 1] with typical element i 2 I. Producers in each industry supply a continuum
of di¤erentiated product varieties Z i = [0; Zi] with typical element z 2 Z i. Workers are
specialized and each industry uses a di¤erent type of worker. Within an industry/country
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pair all workers and producers are identical, and we refer to them as the workers in i=nor
the producers in i=n.
Countries di¤er in terms of both their sizes and their industry productivities. We nor-
malize the worlds labor force (and population) to one and dene Lin as the share of this
labor force in i=n, such that Ln =
R 1
0
Lindi is the share of the worlds population that resides
in country n. Let in be the productivity of workers in i=n. For convenience, we normalize
world average industry productivities to one, i.e.,
P
n2N L
i
n
i
n = 1. This means that a worker
in i=n produces in times the output produced by the worlds average worker in industry i.
Industries di¤er in their sensitivity to borders. In particular, producers in i=n supplying
consumers in country m must ship binm  1 units of their product varieties to ensure that
one unit arrives at destination. Naturally, there are no border costs for internal trade, i.e.,
binn = 1. Thus, if we let P
i
n (z) be the consumer price in country n of a variety z of industry i
produced in country n, arbitrage ensures that P im (z)  binmP in (z) for all destination markets
m 2 N .
2.2 Preferences and consumption
All workers have the same preferences. Let Ci;jn (z) be the consumption of variety z of
industry j by a worker in i=n. Her preferences are described by the following nested CES
utility function:
W in =
Z 1
0
lnCi;jn dj with C
i;j
n =
"Z Zi
0
Ci;jn (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
, (1)
with  > 1. This utility function treats all industries and varieties symmetrically. The
elasticity of substitution between varieties of di¤erent industries is one, while the elasticity
of substitution between varieties of the same industry is .
The budget constraint di¤ers across workers because they face di¤erent prices and earn
di¤erent wages. Let P in (z) be the price of variety z of industry i in country n. Let Y
i
n be the
wage or income of a worker in i=n. The budget constraint of this worker is:
Z 1
0
Z Zj
0
P jn (z)C
i;j
n (z) dzdj  Y in. (2)
Note that all workers in a country face the same prices, but they do not earn the same wage
if they work in di¤erent industries.
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Maximizing the utility function in Equation (1) subject to the budget constraint in Equa-
tion (2) we nd the following spending shares:
P jn (z)C
i;j
n (z)
Y in
=
P jn (z)
1 R Zj
0
P jn (z0)
1  dz0
, (3)
for all z 2 Zj and j 2 I. Equation (3) describes how the worker in i=n distributes her
spending across product varieties of di¤erent industries. Note that all workers distribute
their spending uniformly across industries regardless of prices.4 This is the key simplication
that we obtain by assuming a unit elasticity of substitution between varieties of di¤erent
industries. The distribution of spending across varieties within a given industry is not
uniform, though. Since the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same industry
is higher than one, a larger share of spending goes to cheaper varieties.
Substituting the consumptions implicit in Equation (3) into the utility function in Equa-
tion (1), we obtain the indirect utility function:
W in = lnY
i
n  
Z 1
0
lnP jndj, (4)
where P jn is the ideal price index of industry j in country n:
P jn =
"Z Zj
0
P jn (z)
1  dz
# 1
1 
. (5)
The welfare of the worker in i=n depends positively on her wage and negatively on industry
prices. Thus, we will focus on the e¤ects of an economic union on wages fY ing and prices
fP ing to predict attitudes towards the union.
2.3 Technology and production
In all industries, there is an arbitrarily large set of product varieties that can be potentially
produced. In each industry/country pair, there is an arbitrarily large set of potential pro-
ducers that can produce these varieties. To produce Qin (z) > 0 units of variety z, producers
4That is,
R Zj
0
P jn (z)C
i;j
n (z) dz = Y
i
n for all j.
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in i=n need Lin (z) units of labor as given by:
Lin (z) =
+Qin (z)
in
, (6)
where  > 0 is a xed cost that is paid only if production is positive; and recall that
in is the productivity of workers in i=n. This formulation of labor requirements can be
interpreted as the sum of a xed cost, i.e., =in workers are required to start producing;
and a variable cost, i.e., 1=in additional workers are required per unit of output produced.
Labor productivity a¤ects both aspects of production. Thus, productivity di¤erences are
not only industry/country specic, but also labor-augmenting.
The main results of this setup are well known: (i) active producers choose to produce
di¤erentiated products and act as monopolists in product markets; (ii) potential producers
pay the xed cost and become active until prots are eliminated. Thus, each industry
contains a continuum of monopolistic competitors, each of them producing a di¤erentiated
product in a single location and earning zero prots. Since there is a single producer for
each product variety, for any variety z of industry i produced in country n we have that:
P im (z) = b
i
nmP
i
n (z) (7)
for all industries and origin/destination pairs. Thus, we can construct the demand schedule
for any product variety by adding the demands from workers in all country/industry pairs:5
P in (z)Q
i
n (z) =
X
m2N
[binmP
i
n (z)]
1 R Zi
0
P im (z
0)1  dz0
Z 1
0
LjmY
j
mdj. (8)
Equation (8) says that sales are a declining function of price. In particular, an increase in
the price of a product variety by one percent leads to a  1 percent decrease in sales. Sales
also depend negatively on border costs, and positively on the incomes of all countries and
the prices of other product varieties in the industry. These additional determinants of sales,
however, are taken as given by producers.
Producers in i=nmaximize prots subject to the technology in Equation (6), the wage Y in,
and the demand schedule in Equation (8). Free entry ensures that there are enough active
producers in i=n to bring prots down to zero. These observations imply two standard
5Note that Qin (z) =
P
m2N b
i
nm
R 1
0
Cj;im (z) dj and then use the consumptions implicit in Equation (3).
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results:
P in =

   1
Y in
in
(9)
and
Qin (z) =  (   1) . (10)
Equation (9) says that producers charge a markup over labor costs. Equation (10) says that
the production of each variety is increasing in the xed cost and the elasticity of demand.
Since each producer in i=n demands the services of =in specialized workers (see Equa-
tions (6) and (10)) and there is measure Lin of specialized workers available in the country,
the measure of active producers in i=n must be Lin
i
n= (). Adding across countries, we
nd the measure of product varieties of industry i produced in the world:
Zi =
1

, (11)
where we have used the normalization
P
n2N L
i
n
i
n = 1.
2.4 Solving for industry incomes and prices
Let us now solve for industry prices in country n. To determine those, it is convenient to
dene the supply of labor in i=n and its wage in terms of e¢ ciency units, respectively:
H in  inin and yin 
Y in
in
. (12)
Note then that (i) the measure of product varieties produced in i=n is proportional to the
former: H in= (); while (ii) the price in any country m of all product varieties from i=n is
proportional to the latter: yinb
i
nm= (   1).
These observations, together with Equation (5), imply that:
P in =
"
1

X
m2N
H im
 
yimb
i
mn
1 # 11 
, (13)
where    (   1)1  to simplify notation. Equation (13) describes the ideal price index
of industry i for residents of country n. This price index displays the benets of forward
linkages that increase with access to import markets. It is increasing with border costs bimn,
especially those that hinder importing from countries with a large and productive labor force
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in the industry H im since these countries produce a larger measure of varieties and from
countries with low wages per e¢ ciency unit of labor in the industry yim since these countries
sell their products at a lower price.
Let us next solve for wages in i=n. Since producers earn zero prots all the sales revenues
earned by producers in i=n accrue to workers in i=n. To nd those, we simply note that the
spending of country m on products of country n is given by:
1

H in

yinb
i
nm
P im
1  Z 1
0
Hjmy
j
mdj. (14)
This expression is the product of three terms: (i) the measure of varieties produced by the
workers in i=n; (ii) the share of spending on each of these varieties by workers in country m;
and (iii) the combined income of all workers in country m. Thus, the product of these terms
gives us the sales in country m of producers in i=n. Adding these sales across all countries,
we nd the income of workers in i=n:
yin =
"
1

X
m2N

P im
binm
 1 Z 1
0
Hjmy
j
mdj
# 1

. (15)
Equation (15) describes the wage per e¢ ciency unit of workers in i=n. This nominal wage
displays the benets of backward linkages that increase with access to export markets. It is
decreasing with border costs binm, especially those that hinder exporting to large and produc-
tive countries since these countries generate greater demand (
R 1
0
Hjmy
j
mdj) and countries
with high price indices P im since exports face weaker competition in those markets.
Equations (13) and (15) can be solved for the matrix of equilibrium industry prices fP ing
and incomes fying as a function of border costs, up to a choice of numeraire. We use world
income as the numeraire and set
P
n2N
R 1
0
H iny
i
ndi = 1 from now on. Thus, all incomes can
be interpreted as shares of world income. Our focus is on border costs fbimng, which are not
exogenous: we turn to them now.
3 Modeling an economic union
What determines the matrix of bilateral border costs? How does an economic union a¤ect
this matrix? We now add to our framework a theory of border costs and the impact of an
economic union on them. This theory recognizes that all economic unions are not the same.
In particular, unions vary in their depth, i.e., the measure of industries covered; and their
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breadth, i.e., the set of countries included. We study how these features of the union a¤ect
the distribution of industry incomes and prices.
3.1 A stylized theory of border costs
There is a share of industries that are insensitive to borders. In particular, assume that
border costs for products varieties of these industries are negligible. We assign low indices
to these industries:
if i 2 [0;  ] , then binm = 1 for all n;m 2 N . (16)
The rest of the industries are sensitive to border costs. In particular, assume these costs
are prohibitive unless an economic union removes them. An economic union (or union, for
brevity) is dened by the measure of industries covered: t 2 [0; 1   ]; and the set of member
countries: U  N . These two features jointly determine its e¤ects on border costs:
if i 2 [ ; 1) , then binm =
(
1 if n = m or i 2 ( ;  + t] and n;m 2 U
1 otherwise. (17)
That is, the union removes border costs between its members (i.e., n 2 U) for the measure
of industries covered (i.e., i 2 ( ;  + t]). Inside the union, these industries enjoy a single
common market. Outside the union, these industries are local.
There are thus three types of industries: (i) those with global markets: i 2 [0;  ]; (ii)
those with local markets: i 2 ( + t; 1] for n 2 U and i 2 ( ; 1] for n =2 U ; and (iii) those with
a union market: i 2 ( ;  + t] for n 2 U . We shall use this simple model in what follows,
and focus on the e¤ects of t and U .
For later reference, we denote the aggregate factor endowment of the union in industry i
by H iU 
P
n2U H
i
n.
3.2 Industry incomes and prices with an economic union
We derive now industry incomes and prices for a given economic union with membership
U and industry coverage t. The rst observation is that spending is uniformly distributed
across industries. This is a direct implication of assuming a unit elasticity of substitution
between varieties of di¤erent industries. Thus, each industry receives an income equal to
one (recall that world income has been normalized to one), and we only need to determine
how this income is distributed within industries.
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In global industries, border costs are negligible and the prices of all product varieties are
equalized. Thus, in these industries factor prices are also equalized in terms of e¢ ciency
units. Since we have normalized the worlds factor endowment in each industry to 1:
yin = 1 if i 2 [0;  ] . (18)
Equation (18) implies that the share of industry income that goes to any individual worker is
her share of world output in the industry. Hence, workersincomes equal their productivities:
Y in = 
i
n.
In local industries, border costs are prohibitive and countries consume only the prod-
uct varieties produced within the country. Since spending is uniformly distributed across
varieties, factor incomes are determined by local factor scarcity:
yin =
1
H in
Z 1
0
Hjny
j
ndj if either i 2 ( + t; 1] and n 2 U or i 2 ( ; 1] and n =2 U . (19)
Equation (19) simply reects the fact that the aggregate spending on industry i=n (H iny
i
n)
equals the average spending or income in country n (
R 1
0
Hjny
j
ndj).
In union industries, the situation is a bit more complex. Border costs are prohibitive
outside the union and, as a result, union members only consume product varieties produced
within the union. Border costs are negligible inside the union, though, so that the prices of
all union product varieties are equalized. As a consequence, factor prices are also equalized
within the union:
yin =
1
H iU
X
m2U
Z 1
0
Hjmy
j
mdj if i 2 ( ;  + t] and n 2 U . (20)
Equation (20) is the direct equivalent of Equation (19) when the market is the union instead
of the country. Unionwide spending on industry i (H iUy
i
n) equals average income in the union
(
P
m2U
R 1
0
Hjmy
j
mdj).
Equations (18) and (19) su¢ ce to characterize equilibrium factor rewards in all coun-
tries that do not belong to the union. Equation (20) completes the characterization for
union members. We can now use these equations to determine equilibrium incomes in every
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country-industry i=n:
Y in =
8>>>><>>>>:
in if i 2 [0;  ]
YU
H iU
in if i 2 ( ;  + t] and n 2 U
Yn
H in
in otherwise,
(21)
where Yn 
R 1
0
H iny
i
ndi is country ns nominal income (i.e., its share of the worlds nominal
income) and YU 
P
n2U
R 1
0
H iny
i
ndi is the unions nominal income. In equilibrium, these can
be expressed explicitly as:
YU =
1

Z 
0
H iUdi (22)
and
Yn =
8><>:
1

R 
0
H indi if n =2 U
1
 + t
R 
0
H indi+ YU
R +t

H in
H iU
di

if n 2 U .
(23)
Equations (21), (22) and (23) show how income is distributed across industry/country pairs.
The design of the union, i.e., t and U , determines the set of union industries and how income
is distributed within this set of industries.
In global industries, incomes reect productivities. In local industries, factors are ex-
pensive in countries where they are scarce relative to the countrys aggregate income. In
union industries, factors are expensive in industries whose union-wide endowment is scarce
relative to the unions aggregate income. Aggregate incomes reect productivities in all
tradable industries. For countries that do not belong to the union, and for the union as a
whole, nominal income simply equals the average factor endowment in e¤ective units across
all global industries. For union members, nominal income can be intuitively decomposed as
a weighted average of the countrys income in global industries and the countrys share of
the unions income in union industries.
These results allow us to compute industry prices as follows:
P in =
8>>>><>>>>:

1
 1 if i 2 [0;  ]

1
 1 (H iU)
  1
 1 YU
H iU
if i 2 ( ;  + t] and n 2 U

1
 1 (H in)
  1
 1 Yn
H in
otherwise.
(24)
To interpret Equation (24), recall that prices are low in the industries that o¤er many
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varieties at a low price per variety. Global industries o¤er many varieties at a uniform
average price. Union industries o¤er less variety (H iU < 1) at a price that reects the union-
wide relative scarcity of each industry relative to the average global industry (YU=H iU). Local
industries o¤er even less variety (H in < H
i
U) at a price that reects the local scarcity of a
non-tradable industry relative to the average tradable industry (Yn=H in). Naturally, non-
tradables are expensive if their supply is scarce because the country has limited resources to
produce them, while demand is plentiful because the country is good at producing tradables.
The intuitions are thus clear: consumers care about both product variety and product prices,
and the design of the union a¤ects both.
4 The distribution of gains and losses from the union
We are now ready to derive predictions about the political support for the union. To do
this, we ask the inhabitants of our theoretical world whether a specic union raises their
welfare relative to having no union at all. We then record their positive answers as support
for the union, and the negative ones as opposition to the union. Thus, our exercise consists
of counting winners and losers.
4.1 The gains from union membership
Let W in (t;U) be the welfare of workers in i=n with a union that covers a measure t of
industries and a set U of countries. Then, we dene W in (t;U) as the change in welfare that
the union generates relative to a scenario without the union:
W in (t;U)  W in (t;U) W in (0; ;) . (25)
We say that workers in i=n support the union ifW in (t;U) > 0 and oppose it ifW in (t;U) <
0. If the union has no e¤ect on welfare, we say that workers in i=n are indi¤erent about the
union.
We start with the following observation:
W in (t;U) =  lnYn (t;U) 
Z 1
0
 lnP jn (t;U) dj +  ln
Y in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) (26)
where  lnYn (t;U),  lnP jn (t;U) and  lnY in (t;U) are dened analogously as di¤erences
relative to a scenario without the union. Equation (26) breaks down the e¤ects of the union
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for the worker in i=n into two components: (i) the welfare gains for an articial representative
worker of country n (the rst two terms in Equation (26)); plus (ii) a redistribution that
a¤ects the worker in i=n (the third term in Equation (26)).
We can interpret the rst component as the welfare gains of a policy package that in-
cludes both union membership and a redistributive policy that keeps the domestic income
distribution unchanged. Such a policy is implemented with the following set of transfers:
X in (t;U) =
Y in (0; ;)
Yn (0; ;)Yn (t;U)  Y
i
n (t;U) . (27)
This policy is self-nanced, i.e.,
R 1
0
X in (t;U) di = 0, and it implies that the gains from union
membership are equally shared by all workers in country n. Thus, if asked whether country
n should adopt a policy package that includes both union membership and the redistributive
policy, all workers in n would give the same answer. If asked instead whether country n
should become a member of the union without any redistributive policy, disagreement arises
as shown in Equation (26).
Naturally, this second case of unequal sharing is the empirically relevant one. But we
start analyzing the case of equal sharing because it is easier analytically, and because it is a
rst step towards analyzing the case of unequal sharing.
4.2 Union membership with equal sharing of gains
With equal sharing of the gains from union membership, all workers in n experience an
identical change in welfare. Moreover, this change in welfare is always non-negative and it
can be decomposed into two non-negative components:
 lnYn (t;U) 
Z 1
0
 lnP in (t;U) di = GIntran (t;U) +GIntern (t;U)  0, (28)
where
GIntran (t;U) =
1
   1
Z +t

ln
H iU
H in
di  0 (29)
and
GIntern (t;U) = ( + t) ln

1
 + t


R 
0
H indiR 
0
H iUdi
+
Z +t

H in
H iU
di

   ln
R 
0
H indiR 
0
H iUdi
 
Z +t

ln
H in
H iU
di  0 (30)
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These components measure, respectively, the gains from intra- and inter-industry trade en-
abled by union membership. To be clear, even without union membership country n enjoys
the benets of intra- and inter-industry trade in global industries. The terms GIntran (t;U)
and GIntern (t;U) measure only the increase in the gains from trade that results from union
membership, and not the total gains from trade.
The rst term, GIntran (t;U), captures the gains from intra-industry trade in union in-
dustries. Consumers reduce their consumption of local varieties in favor of newly available
product varieties from other union members. The second term, GIntern (t;U), measures the
gains from inter-industry trade in both union and global industries. The union market allows
countries to run surpluses in union industries in which they have a comparative advantage;
and to run decits in union industries in which they have a comparative disadvantage. In
addition, there are also gains from trade across the two sets of global and union industries.
Depending on its pattern of comparative advantage, a country could run a net trade surplus
(or decit) with the union across all union industries, and compensate it with increased
imports (or exports) in global industries.
This decomposition highlights a few results that apply to our setting, some of which are
familiar from trade theory.
1. The representative workers gains from union membership increase with the size of
the unions economy, and decrease with the size of the countrys. Multiplying all the
endowmentsH iU of the union by a factor larger than one raisesG
Intra
n (t;U), while it does
not a¤ect GIntern (t;U). Hence, the benet of union membership increases with union
size. Consider two countries n and m such that H in is obtained by multiplying H
i
m by a
factor larger than one. Then, GIntran (t;U) < GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) = GInterm (t;U).
Hence, the benet of union membership declines with country size. These e¤ects of
size work entirely through intra-industry trade. Larger unions provide greater variety
in the union market, which is especially valuable for small countries that have less
variety in their domestic market.
2. The representative workers gains from union membership are increasing with di¤er-
ences between the countrys and the unions distribution of factor endowments across
union industries. Consider two countries n and m such that, in union industries,
fH in=H iUgi2[ ;+t] is obtained as a mean-preserving spread of fH im=H iUgi2[ ;+t]. Then,
GIntran (t;U) > GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) > GInterm (t;U). These e¤ects of specializa-
tion work both through intra- and inter-indutry trade. If country n is highly specialized
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in a subset of union industries, it gains a lot from the ability to export in those in-
dustries, and import instead in other union industries. In comparative-disadvantage
industries it reaps consumer gains through both greater variety and lower price per
variety.
3. The representative workers gains from union membership are independent of dif-
ferences between the countrys and the worlds distribution of factor endowments
across global industries. Consider two countries n and m such that, in global in-
dustries, fH ingi2[0; ] is obtained as a mean-preserving spread of fH imgi2[0; ].6 Then,
GIntran (t;U) = GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) = GInterm (t;U). Of course, specialization
across global industries also creates intra- and inter-industry gains from trade, and
those are larger in country n than in country m. However these gains are not contin-
gent on union membership and, as a result, they do no a¤ect the value of the union.
4. The representative workers gains from union membership exhibit a U -shaped pattern
in the average size of the countrys global industries. Moreover, the global minimum
is reached when the average income of global industries equals the average income
of union industries. Consider two countries n and m with identical endowments in
union industries: H in = H
i
m for i 2 ( ;  + t]. If each countrys average income in
global industries is less than their common average income in union industries, then
the country with the lowest average income in global industries has greater gains from
union membership:
if
1

Z 
0
H indi <
1

Z 
0
H imdi 
1

Z 
0
H iUdi
1
t
Z +t

H in
H iU
di
then GIntran (t;U) = GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) > GInterm (t;U) . (31)
If each countrys average income in global industries is more than their common average
income in union industries, then the country with the greatest average income in global
industries has greater gains from union membership:
if
1

Z 
0
H indi >
1

Z 
0
H imdi >
1

Z 
0
H iUdi
1
t
Z +t

H in
H iU
di
then GIntran (t;U) = GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) > GInterm (t;U) . (32)
6Recall that the world has a unit endowment in each industry. Thus, Hin and H
i
m are the shares of the
world endowment of workers in industry i in country n and m, respectively.
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These e¤ects of specialization work entirely through inter-industry trade. If a countrys
average endowment in global industries is more di¤erent from its average endowment
in union industries, union membership enables the country to have unbalanced trade
across union industries as a whole, and to compensate this imbalance with trade in
global industries.7
5. A similar result for the average size of the countrys union industries involves some
ambiguity. On the one hand, gains from inter-industry trade increase as the average
income of the countrys union industries diverges from the average income of global
industries: this is exactly the e¤ect discussed in the previous point. On the other hand,
however, gains from intra-industry trade decrease as the average size of the countrys
union industries increases. Overall, the representative workers gains from union mem-
bership may exhibit either a U -shaped or a L-shaped pattern in the average size of the
countrys global industries. Consider two countries n and m whose endowments are
identical in global industries and equiproportional in union industries: H in = H
i
m for
i 2 [0;  ] and H in = H im for i 2 ( ;  + t] for some  > 0. If each countrys average
income in union industries is less than their common average income in global indus-
tries, then the country with the lowest average income in union industries has greater
gains from union membership:
if  < 1 and
1
t
Z +t

H im
H iU
di
1

Z 
0
H iUdi 
1

Z 
0
H indi
then GIntran (t;U) > GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) > GInterm (t;U) . (33)
If each countrys average income in union industries is more than their common average
income in global industries, then their gains from union membership are unambiguously
ranked in general:
if  > 1 and
1
t
Z +t

H im
H iU
di
1

Z 
0
H iUdi 
1

Z 
0
H indi
then GIntran (t;U) < GIntram (t;U) and GIntern (t;U) > GInterm (t;U) ; (34)
if    1  t= , however, gains from intra-industry trade dominate and n unambigu-
7To establish these results, suppose country ns endowment in global industries

Hin
	
i2[0; ] is scaled by
a factor   > 0. Then, all else equal, @GIntran =@  = 0 while @G
Inter
n =@  = t
 
     =    + t   for a
unique minimizer    (1=t) R +t

 
Hin=H
i
U

di
R 
0
HiUdi=
R 
0
Hindi.
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ously has lower gains from union membership than m: GIntran (t;U) + GIntern (t;U) <
GIntram (t;U) +GInterm (t;U).8
The analysis so far has assumed that union membership is accompanied by a redistrib-
utive policy that ensures that the gains from union membership are equally shared. This
assumption allowed us to focus on the representative worker of country n. In the absence
of redistributive policies, the gains from union membership are not equally shared. In par-
ticular, union membership also disrupts the domestic income distribution in every member
country, so much so that it may leave some residents worse o¤. We turn now to these
distributive tensions.
4.3 Union membership with unequal sharing of gains
Union membership creates redistribution among workers in di¤erent industries. Equations
(21), (22) and (23) immediately imply the following changes in workersshares of national
income:
 ln
Y in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
ln
R 
0
H indiR 
0
H iUdi
  ln

1
 + t


R 
0
H indiR 
0
H iUdi
+
R +t

H in
H iU
di

if i 2 [0;  ]
ln
H in
H iU
  ln

1
 + t


R 
0
H indiR 
0
H iUdi
+
R +t

H in
H iU
di

if i 2 ( ;  + t]
0 if i 2 ( + t; 1] .
(35)
The share of world income accruing to global industries does not change with union
membership, but country ns share of world income does change. Thus, the log change in
the share of nationalincome of workers in all global industries equals the opposite of the
countrys change in income:
 ln
Y in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) = ln
Yn (0; ;)
Yn (t;U) if i 2 [0;  ] . (36)
Without union membership, both union and local industries have the countrys average
income: Y in (0; ;) =Yn (0; ;) = 1 if i 2 ( ; 1]. Local industries still do with union membership,
8To establish these results, suppose country ns endowment in union industries

Hin
	
i2[;+t] is scaled
by a factor  > 0. Then, all else equal, @GIntran =@ =  t= [(   1) ] < 0 while @GIntern =@ =
t
 
   =    + t for a unique minimizer   1= . Overall, @  GIntran +GIntern  =@ =
t

[(   1)    t]    	 = (   1)    + t, which is monotone decreasing for    1  t= and oth-
erwise has a unique minimum at = (   1  t=) > .
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so their share of national income is unchanged. For each union industry, instead, the log
change in its share of the countrys nominal income is equal to its log share with union
membership:
 ln
Y in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) = ln
Y in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) if i 2 ( ;  + t] . (37)
Additional intuition about these changes in the domestic income distribution can be
obtained if we focus on the changes in industry trade balances generated by union member-
ship. Consider rst union industries. For each of these industries, its share of the countrys
nominal income equals:
Y in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) = 1 +
T in (t;U)
Yn (t;U) if i 2 ( ;  + t] , (38)
where T in denotes country ns net exports in industry i.
9 Export industries gain income
relative to the representative worker. These industries experience a terms of trade improve-
ment that raises wages and their share of national income. Import industries, however, lose
income relative to the representative worker. These industries experience a terms of trade
worsening that lowers wages and their share of national income.
Consider next global industries. Without union membership, some of these industries
have a trade surplus, and therefore their income is above the countrys average. Other
industries have a trade decit and therefore their income is below the countrys average. On
average, however, the set of global industries have a zero trade balance. Union membership
does not a¤ect within-industry variation in trade balances. But it does a¤ect the average
trade balance, and therefore it a¤ects all global industries in the same way. In particular,
the change in the domestic income share of any global industry is driven by:
Yn (0; ;)
Yn (t;U) = 1 
1

R +t

T in (t;U) di
Yn (t;U) : (39)
Since overall trade must remain balanced, the change in the trade surplus (or decit) in
each global industry equals the total trade decit of union industries divided by the mass
of global industries. If union industries as a whole are net exporters, all global industries
must reduce their net exports or increase their net imports, so they become net importers
on average and su¤er a terms of trade worsening that lowers their share of national income.
9In each union industry i 2 ( ;  + t], a member n has net exports to the union T inU = YUHin=HiU   Yn.
The relationship between net exports and income redistribution from union membership then follows from
Equations (21) and (23).
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If instead union industries as a whole are net importers, all global industries must increase
their net exports or reduce their net imports, so they become net exporters on average and
enjoy a terms of trade improvement that raises their share of national income.
Naturally, the trade balance in local industries is zero both without and with union
membership. As a result, local industries do not experience a change in the share of national
income.
These results suggest that workers in all local industries and all exporting union industries
support union membership. Whether workers in global industries and workers in importing
union industries support union membership is ambiguous. But we can still say a few things
about them. Workers in importing union industries are divided. Those with a weak com-
parative disadvantage still support the union since it lowers the cost of living. Those with a
strong comparative disadvantage do not support the union. All workers in global industries
are a¤ected in the same way. Thus, all global industries support union membership if, as a
group, they have a comparative advantage relative to union industries. Otherwise, they may
or may not support union membership. They will support it because of its consumer benets
if the average comparative disadvantage of global industries relative to union industries is
weak. They will oppose the union because of producer losses if their average comparative
disadvantage is strong.
Finally, it is worth saying a bit more about the redistribution caused by the union.
In a sense, all our simplifying assumptions have been designed to manage the shape of
this redistribution so as to obtain a clear theoretical benchmark. For instance, there is no
redistribution between tradable (global and union) and non-tradable (local) industries. The
reason, of course, is the unit elasticity of substitution between products of di¤erent industries.
If this elasticity were larger than one, there would also be a redistribution from non-tradable
industries to tradable ones. If this elasticity were less than one, this redistribution would go
in the opposite direction.
There is no redistribution either from non-members of the union to members of the
union or vice versa. Even if we kept the unit elasticity assumption, we would observe such
redistribution if border costs were not extreme. Since the union lowers the cost of trading
among its members, it shifts demand towards union members and away from non-members.
We do not observe this shift of demand away from non-members because there is no such
demand with extreme border costs. If we made these costs less extreme, the creation of
a union would lead to redistribution from non-members to members within the a¤ected
industries.
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All these complications might be important in quantitative applications. However, they
seem likely to be less central than the already rich pattern of redistribution we focus upon
here. In any case, even these additional redistributive patterns become clearer once we look
at them from the perspective of our stylized benchmark.
5 Application: European integration and its discontents
European integration started when 6 countries Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Paris in 1952 and the Treaty of Rome
in 1957, creating the European Economic Community. Member countries removed custom
duties and agreed on a common agricultural policy. The rst enlargement happened in 1973,
when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the union. During the 1970s, the
union implemented regional policies to help the development of poorer areas and adopted
laws to protect the environment. Over time, the European Parliament increased its inuence
and, from 1979, all citizens started to elect its members directly. In 1981, Greece joined the
union. Spain and Portugal followed in 1986. In the same year, the Single European Act
extended Community powers especially in the area foreign policy. In 1993, the Maastricht
Treaty established the European Union and the Single Market with its four pillars: the
free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. In 1995, the European Union gained
three more new members: Austria, Finland and Sweden.
In 1999, the euro as a currency was launched. Ten new countries Cyprus, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined
the European Union in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In response to the
eurozone debt crisis, the so-called banking unionwas established, transferring responsi-
bilities for banking policy from the national level to the European Union. In 2013, Croatia
became the 28th member. Besides these major events, the European Union was built on
a complex maze of treaties and agreements, steadily widening and deepening the economic
integration between its members.
Ever since its initial foundation, the European Union has also been accompanied by con-
troversy. Clear examples of disagreement are various cases of failed expansions. For instance,
the UKs membership was vetoed by France in 1961; Spains application was rejected by the
European Council in 1962; Norways citizens voted against joining the union in 1967 and
1992. Yet, until recently, the union has always grown in size and scope. In 2016, for the rst
time, a member state the UK voted to leave the union. Anti-European Union sentiment
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has also been on the rise in other countries. What is driving this growing dissatisfaction
with European integration?
5.1 Discontent with the European Union: a theory-based view
Let us use a stylized version of our model to answer this question. There are two types of
countries, W and E. Half of the workers live in W countries and the other half in E coun-
tries. Industries are characterized by a specialization parameter i such that productivity in
industry i is in = 1  i in W countries and in = 1 + i in E countries. The specialization
parameter i is independent of i and uniformly distributed on [ 1; 1], so
R i2
i1
indi = 1 andR i2
i1
lnindi = ln 2  1 for any interval [i1; i2]  [0; 1] and any country n.
Assume that, within each country, workers are uniformly distributed across industries:
Lin = Ln for all i 2 [0; 1]. The set of industries in country n whose workers oppose the union
is fi 2 [0; 1] : W in (t;U) < 0g. We dene 
n as the measure or size of this set, which equals
the share of country ns workers who oppose the union.
Our specication of factor endowments implies that, for all countries and union types,
the average income in union industries equals the average income in global industries. Thus,
the share of domestic income of workers in global industries is not a¤ected by the depth and
breadth of the union. The latter creates redistribution across union industries only.
Consider rst a union of depth t which contains only countries of type W . Then, all
residents of the union support it: 
n = 0. The reason is that GIntran (t;U) > 0 and
GIntern (t;U) = 0. Moreover, everyone supports the union more strongly the deeper it is
(@W in=@t > 0). Thus, everyones preferred union is the deepest one, with t = 1    . One
can think of this as the situation of the European Union early on, when countries were more
similar in factor endowments and most of the gains from trade were of the intra-industry
type.
Consider instead an enlarged union whose residents are evenly split between countries
of type W and countries of type E. Now both GIntran (t;U) > 0 and GIntern (t;U) > 0, so the
union provides more gains to the representative worker than before. But these gains are
not equally shared. In W countries, for instance, union industries with i < 0 run trade
surpluses and have greater gains from union membership than the representative worker,
while union industries with i > 0 run trade decits and have smaller gains from trade than
the representative worker. All workers in global and local industries support the union, and
the question is how many workers in local industries do the same.
Workers in an industry i 2 ( ;  + t) in aW country face an income loss from integration
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whenever i > 0, and they oppose the union if:
ln (1  i) < t
   1

ln
Ln
LU
  (1  ln 2)

. (40)
It follows that the share of country ns residents opposing the union is:

n =
t
2

2
e

Ln
LU
 t
 1
, (41)
such that
@
n
@t
> 0, t < tn     1
 (1  ln 2) + ln (LU=Ln) . (42)
Essentially, the set of losers contains all workers in comparative-disadvantage industries
that su¤er an income loss that exceeds a threshold. This threshold reects the gains for
the representative worker from the reduction in the cost of living that results from union
membership. This reduction, and therefore the threshold, is larger the smaller is the country.
With a union of dissimilar countries, the e¤ect of union depth is nonlinear. The set of
a¤ected industries grows linearly, and these are the industries with losers. However, among
a¤ected industries, fewer are net losers as union depth increases. In this example, these two
e¤ects combine in a non-monotonic way. Initially, as the union becomes deeper the rst
e¤ect dominates and opposition to the union grows. However, provided that
 [ + (1  ) ln 2] + ln Ln
LU
< 1, (43)
opposition to the union peaks at a union depth tn < 1    and then declines as depth
increases further.
The intuition provided by this example is that a union becomes unstable and fragile
when its member countries have su¢ ciently di¤erent patterns of comparative advantage,
and thus su¢ ciently large imbalances in intra-union trade. While such a union creates
greater e¢ ciency gains than a union among homogeneous countries, those gains accrue to
consumers and to winners in each countrys export industries. Instead, losers emerge whose
welfare is reduced by the union. A marginal reduction in union depth is likely to be one
strategy to reduce their number. However, another and more e¢ cient strategy may be a big
pushtowards much closer integration. As Equation (43) highlights, this second possibility
exists when a fully integrated common market is valuable enough, i.e., when gains from
intra-industry trade are high ( is low) and trade without union policies is limited ( is low).
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Both Equation (43) and Equation (41) show that opposition to a heterogeneous union
is greater in larger member countries. The reason, intuitively, is that residents of larger
economies stand to gain less as consumers from the common union market. Therefore, they
are more sensitive to the losses they may su¤er as producers in import-competing indus-
tries. Finally, note that Equation (41) measures the share of industries in country n that
oppose the union. We have assumed for ease of exposition that workers are uniformly dis-
tributed across industries, but it is straightforward to relax this assumption. Then, popular
opposition to the union will be greater in countries with a larger share of the workforce
in low-productivity, comparative-disadvantage sectors. These two forces lower consumer
gains in larger economies, and more numerous losers in countries with greater employment
in import-competing industries are the two predictions that we examine next.
Before doing this, it is worth also noting that ultimately the union becomes unpopular
because countries are not implementing redistributive policies that ensure an equal or fair
sharing of the gains from union membership. With such policies in place, union membership
would be universally supported.
5.2 Discontent with the European Union: the data
The Eurobarometer, a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the
European Commission, contains data that can be used to study how attitudes towards the
European Union vary across countries and have evolved over time. These surveys address
a variety of issues relating to the European Union and have been conducted both in EU
countries and in prospective member states. In this section, we focus on one question:
In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly
negative or very negative image? Compared to the data used to draw Figure 1, on the
perceived economic benets from the European Union, answers to this question are available
for all 28 current European Union countries, but only for the more recent period from 2000
to 2018. For both questions, the share of respondents with a positive view exhibits slightly
less variation, while the margin between negative and undecided answers appears to move
more. This is already evident from Figure 1. For this reason, and to be closer to the goal of
studying euroskepticism, we choose as our main variable of interest the share of respondents
with a fairly negative or very negative imageof the European Union.10
10Yet, there is a strong negative correlation between the share of respondents with negative and positive
views (-0.83) and both questions yield the same qualitative patterns.
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Figure 2: Negative image of the EU, averages. Source: Eurobarometer.
Figure 2 plots the evolution over time of this measure of discontent. The solid line
corresponds to the European Union simple average, the dashed line is the simple average for
the sample of 15 member countries in 2000, and the dotted line is the European Union average
weighted by population. A number of facts stands out. First, the gure shows a growing
dissatisfaction that started around 2007 and continued until 2012. Clearly, one culprit is the
eurozone debt crisis. However, the deterioration of the image of the European Union seems
to predate the crisis. Second, the dashed line (EU 15 average) is above the solid line (EU
average), implying that new members tend to have a more positive view of the European
Union. Moreover the di¤erence seems to have grown, at least until 2016. This means that
dissatisfaction has grown especially in countries that were part of the European Union before
the accession of new members and suggests that enlargement fatiguemay have played a
role. Third, the dotted line (population weighted average) is closer to the dashed line (EU 15
average), conrming that new members tend to be smaller in size. Finally, all lines display
strong co-movements, suggesting that some of the driving forces may be common to many
countries.
As a next step, we do a simple variance decomposition exercise. We ask what fraction of
the variance in attitudes towards the European Union is accounted for by time-specic com-
27
AT
BE
BG
HR
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
EL
HU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PTRO
SK
SI ES
SE
UK
5
10
15
20
25
30
22 24 26 28 30lgdp
Fitted values Negative Image of EU
Figure 3: Negative image of the EU by economic size. Data for 2017. Source: Eurobarometer
and Eurostat.
mon factors and country-specic factors. We do this by comparing the R-squared obtained
by regressing the share of respondents with a negative image of the European Union on year
and country xed e¤ects. This exercise shows that the largest source of variation is cross
sectional: country xed e¤ects alone explain 49% of the data, while year dummies accounts
for 17%. We now discuss the main factors that, according to our model, may explain the
observed time and cross-sectional variation.
Starting from the latter, our model suggests that an important determinant of preferences
for the union is economic size: larger and richer countries benet relatively less from adopting
union policies. To have a rst sense of whether this prediction is consistent with the data,
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of respondents with a negative image of the European Union
(vertical axis) against the logarithm of aggregate GDP (horizontal axis) in 2017.11 The
picture shows a clear positive association between size and a negative image of the European
Union, highlighted in the graph by the linear regression line. The gure is also useful to
11We use nominal GDP to focus on economic size net of price e¤ects. However, results are qualitatively
similar when using real GDP.
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visualize the cross-sectional variation in the data. It is immediate to see that countries di¤er
substantially in their attitude towards the union. The most pro-Europe members states
(less than 10% of respondents with a negative view) include small countries such as Malta,
Lithuania and Ireland, but also Germany, despite its size. Countries with a strong anti-
Europe attitude (more than 20% of respondents with a negative view) include several large
economies, such as the UK and Italy, but also Greece.
Regarding the time variation, our theory suggests that European Union enlargement
may be an important factor. While a bigger union is better at promoting trade, it may
lead to more disagreement if new members make the union more diverse. This is indeed
what happened. As gure 4 shows, enlargements have made the European Union more
heterogeneous in economic terms. The gure shows the average aggregate GDP of union
members relative to the average GDP of the six founding members. The gure conrms that,
almost invariably, each enlargement included countries with an economic size on average
smaller than the initial members. Moreover, the sharpest drop in average country size
happens after the 2004 enlargement. The European Union has also become more diverse in
terms of factor endowments: since 2004, new member states were not just smaller, but also
on average poorer and with lower levels of education.
Our theory then suggests that enlargement fatigue could be driven, at least in part,
by a dissatisfaction of the larger economies with the extent of economic integration with
much smaller and poorer economies. Increased trade with countries with di¤erent factor en-
dowments may have had redistributive e¤ects that heightened disagreement over the union
within countries. This argument is consistent with the simple observations that the UK
has always been one of the largest economies in the European Union and that UK workers
employed in sectors more exposed to import competition from Eastern Europe voted pre-
dominantly to leave the union. Besides the enlargement, our theory also suggests that the
attitude towards the European Union may also be a¤ected by any other changes that make
workers in a country more exposed to import competition from the union.
5.3 Size, import competition and attitudes towards the European Union
We now study the relationship between economic size, import competition and discontent
towards the European Union more systematically. To this end, we have collected a number
of additional variables sourced from Eurostat. To measure aggregate economic size, we
consider separately the logarithm of population and of GDP per capita. Breaking down the
two components of size is useful as they exhibit signicantly di¤erent variation over time
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Figure 4: Average aggregate GDP of EUmember states relative to the six founding countries.
Source: Eurostat.
and across countries.
Next, we are interested in measuring workersexposure to import competition from other
European Union members. Our model suggests that workers employed in sectors with a
comparative disadvantage relative to other countries in the European Union should have
a more negative view of the union. To test this prediction, we have collected data on
employment and the value of production at a detailed sectoral level (NACE classication,
level 2) from the Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database, describing the structure
and performance of businesses across the European Union. Then, for each country-year, we
computed the fraction of employment in industries with a share of domestic production lower
than the income share of the country in the European Union.12 According to our model,
this variable captures the share of workers in industries with a comparative disadvantage
who might lose income due to import competition from the European Union.13 It measures
12We compute this measure for industry only and disregard construction, distributive trades and services
mostly because of the high number of missing values in the latter sectors. Moreover, traded goods are heavily
concentrated in industry.
13The model implies that a country is keener on union membership if it has more workers in union
industries with net exports to the union. Given that in reality we cannot distinguish between union and
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Figure 5: Employment share exposed to import competition from the EU. Source: Eurostat
SBS.
aversion to the union net of size e¤ects, which are instead captured separately by GDP, and
other price e¤ects.
Exposure to import competition, which is available from 2000 to 2016, varies both because
the structure of employment and production varies in all countries, but also because the
composition of the European Union changes over time. For this variable, Figure 5 plots the
evolution of the European Union simple average (solid line) and the simple average for the
sample of 15 member countries in 2000 (dashed line). The rise in the dashed line and its
divergence from the solid line after 2004 indicate that the enlargement has made workers in
the initial EU 15 countries more exposed to import competition from new members, whose
workforce is more concentrated in sectors with net exports. Interestingly, the fact that the
dashed line (EU 15 average) keeps rising suggests that import competition from new member
states has grown even after the accession. Moreover, comparing Figure 5 to Figure 2 it is easy
to see that exposure to import competition in the EU 15 countries and a negative attitude
global industries, and that EU countries trade predominantly with each other, we compute exposure to EU
import competition across all industries.
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Figure 6: Negative image of the EU and employment share exposed to import competition
in 2016. Source: Eurostat (SBS) and Eurobarometer.
towards the European Union display a similar evolution, both peaking in 2012.
Figure 6 shows instead a scatter plot of respondents with a negative image of the European
Union (vertical axis) against the share of workers exposed to import competition from the
European Union (horizontal axis) in 2016. The picture shows a clear positive association
between the fraction of workers in comparative disadvantage industries and a negative image
of the European Union, highlighted by the linear regression line.
Besides these variables, which have clear counterparts in our model, we also consider
a number of additional controls. Since our theory suggests that exporters are keener on
economic integration than importers, we also consider net exports to the European Union,
normalized by the volume of trade with the European Union. The existing literature sug-
gests that negative attitudes towards the European Union are typically associated with
economic hardship, low levels of education and inequality. There is also a popular view that
immigration may have triggered an anti-Europe sentiment. Hence, to account for these com-
plementary explanations, we control for the unemployment rate of the active population (in
percentage points), as a measure of economic crises; for the share of working-age population
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Table 1: Negative image of the EU: Country xed e¤ects
Dependent variable: Negative Image of EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log population 0.370** 0.559*** 0.301** 0.376* 0.237
(0.136) (0.127) (0.121) (0.200) (0.199)
Log GDP pc 0.018 0.035 -0.034 0.012 -0.164**
(0.020) (0.027) (0.028) (0.043) (0.065)
EU imp. comp. (% of emp.) 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.087*** 0.164*** 0.118**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.027) (0.051) (0.053)
EU net exports 0.331*** 0.093 0.123
(0.087) (0.144) (0.102)
Unemployment % 0.008** 0.010** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Tertiary education 0.402*** 0.335 -0.144
(0.131) (0.326) (0.255)
Gini -0.198 0.350 0.686**
(0.170) (0.300) (0.305)
Immigrants (%) -0.538 -0.283
(0.367) (0.330)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Clusters Year Year Year Year Year No
Observations 479 414 414 374 231 227
R-squared 0.517 0.523 0.572 0.739 0.779 0.887
Notes:  All regressions include the intercept. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(25-64) with tertiary education; for the Gini coe¢ cient of the net income distribution, as
a measure of inequality; and for the stock of immigrants as a share of population. Most of
these variables are available for all 28 countries over the period 20002018.14
We start by studying correlates of changes in the negative attitude towards the European
Union, with the caveat that, for some variables of interest, the most meaningful variation
is cross sectional. Table 1 reports panel regressions with country xed e¤ects and standard
errors clustered at the year level. Column (1) shows that the coe¢ cients for both components
of economic size are positive, but only population is statistically signicant (at the 5% level).
14However, exposure to import competition is available until 2016 only. The stock of immigrants has
several missing observations, especially in the rst years of the sample. For this reason, we do not include it
in our main specications.
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This is not too surprising, given that changes in GDP per capita over time are likely to
capture cyclical factors such as the severity of the crisis, which may in turn prompt more
negative views. Column (2) shows, as expected, that changes in import competition from the
European Union are strongly correlated with a negative image of the union. The coe¢ cient
is signicant the 1% level. Column (3) conrms the previous ndings when all these variables
are included simultaneously.
In column (4) we include all the other control variables, except immigration, which has
several missing values. The coe¢ cients for population and import competition remain highly
signicant. Regarding the new controls, perhaps surprisingly, the coe¢ cient for net exports
to the European Union and tertiary education turn out to be positive and signicant. How-
ever, as we shall see, these ndings are not robust, which may reect the fact that changes
in these variables over time are hard to interpret.15 An increase in the unemployment rate is
associated with a more negative view of the European Union, consistent with the view that
the crisis has fueled anti-Europe sentiments. Changes in the Gini coe¢ cient have instead no
statistically signicant correlation. In column (5) we also include the share of immigrants.
Despite the loss of observations, the coe¢ cients for population and import competition re-
main signicant.
Finally, in column (6) we include year xed e¤ects, thereby removing any common factor.
Despite the demanding specication, the positive coe¢ cient for exposure to import compe-
tition remains highly signicant. Interestingly, we now nd that di¤erential increases in
inequality, as captured by the Gini coe¢ cient, are associated with a more negative attitude
towards the European Union. The same applies to the variables capturing macroeconomic
performance: a fall in GDP per capita or an increase in the unemployment rate relative to
other countries is correlated with a lower support for the union.
Next, we focus on the cross sectional variation in the data. Table 2 replicates columns
(1)-(5), but with year xed e¤ects instead of country dummies, and clustering standard errors
at the country level. The coe¢ cients for both components of economic size are still positive,
but now only GDP per capita is statistically signicant (at least at the 5% level). Hence,
rich countries tend to have a more negative view of the European Union. The coe¢ cient
for import competition is also positive and signicant (except in one case). Interestingly,
in the cross section, net exports to the European Union are strongly correlated with a less
negative image of the union. These results conrm that countries with higher employment in
15For instance, changes in net exports to the EU are likley to capture cyclical movements in the current
account balance rather than structural trade patterns.
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Table 2: Negative image of the EU: Year xed e¤ects
Dependent variable: Negative Image of EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log population 0.011 0.004 0.008 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Log GDP pc 0.042** 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.071**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.028)
EU imp. comp. (% of emp.) 0.129* 0.094 0.164** 0.340***
(0.070) (0.067) (0.074) (0.089)
EU net exports -0.176*** -0.239***
(0.046) (0.052)
Unemployment % 0.005 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education -0.108 -0.345**
(0.139) (0.157)
Gini -0.528* -0.219
(0.309) (0.336)
Immigrants (%) 0.139
(0.172)
Country Fixed Effects No No No No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Country Country Country Country Country
Observations 479 414 414 374 227
R-squared 0.274 0.229 0.316 0.468 0.585
Notes:  All regressions include the intercept. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
import-competing sectors and higher imports relative to exports to the European Union tend
to dislike the union more. There is also some evidence that tertiary education is correlated
with a more favorable view of the European Union.
The relatively weak correlation between education and preferences for the European
Union seems in contrast with existing evidence within countries. For instance, for the UK,
Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2017), Pastor and Veronesi (2019) and others nd that voting for
Brexit is associated with low educational attainment. A special survey by the European
Commission (2016) also shows that education markedly a¤ected the attitude of Europeans
towards European Union enlargement: 51% of those who left full-time education at the age
of 20 or later favored European Union enlargement, compared to 35% of those who left at
age 15.
35
Yet, a discrepancy between results within and across countries is consistent with our
model, which highlights di¤erent sources of disagreement over union policies across and
within countries. From this perspective, it is useful to look at how attitudes towards the
European Union vary with the level of education by country. Data from the Eurobarometer
stratied by education groups conrms that the share of respondents with a very positive
or fairly positive image of the European Union in 2017 is on average much higher (48%)
among individuals who left education at the age of 20 or later than among those who left at
age 16-19 (36%) or below (29%). But do these di¤erences between more and less educated
people vary systematically with a countrys income level? In other words, are highly educated
workers more pro-Europe in richer countries? The answer to this question is provided by
Figure 7, which shows the share of positive views among respondents who left education at
age 20+ relative to those who left school at age 16-19, against the log of GDP per capita in
2017. This scatter plot conrms that in all countries but Hungary positive views are more
frequent among better educated people. Strikingly, however, this di¤erence increases with
income. In particular, the coe¢ cient of a linear regression is 0.13, with a standard error of
0.05.16
What can we learn from these results? The evidence suggests that attitudes towards
the European Union mirror the distribution of the gains from intra-EU trade. It broadly
supports the predictions of our theory. Smaller and poorer countries, with a larger share of
employment in export-oriented sectors, reap greater benets from accessing the larger union
market. Within countries, educated workers are more likely to benet from trade because
they tend to be specialized in industries where products are more di¤erentiated and gains
from variety higher (e.g., Epifani and Gancia 2008). At the same time, as in models of inter-
industry trade, gains are larger for workers in export industries, such as the high-skilled in
rich countries, then for those in import-competing industries.17
In line with this view, there is a growing empirical literature suggesting that exposure to
import competition has increased the support for parties and politicians with protectionist,
populist, and nationalist agendas (Colantone and Stanig 2018a, b). While import competi-
tion is often perceived as a major threat of globalization, export opportunities can instead
help explain the support for international unions. The German case is of particular inter-
16A similar scatterplot using data on respondents with a negative view of the EU yields very similar results:
respondents with lower education are more anti-EU in richer countries.
17A recent literature uses structural models to quantify the economic gains from the EU. The results are
consistent with our view. For instance, Caliendo et al. (2017) and Mayer, Vicard and Zignago (2019) nd
that new member states were the largest winners from EU enlargement.
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Figure 7: Economic size and support for the EU by education. Positive image of the EU
in 2017 among high-skill respondents (who left education at age 20+) relative to low-skill
respondents (who left education at age 16-19). Source: Eurobarometer and Eurostat.
est here. Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum (2014) nd that the rise in trade with Eastern
Europe caused job losses in German regions specialized in import-competing industries, but
that these losses were more than compensated by employment gains in export-oriented in-
dustries. Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015) also nd that German regions that gained better
export opportunities reduced their vote share for extreme right-wing parties, at the same
time as it increased in regions that faced sharper import competition.
These results then o¤er some insight on the persistent support for European integration in
Germany. While Germany is the largest economy in Europe, it is also an export powerhouse,
with a trade surplus in a majority of industries. Our framework then suggests that German
workers are uncommonly keen on the Single Market because they are more likely to be
employed in sectors with positive net exports to the European Union.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have shown how the support for international unions can become weaker as member
countries become more dissimilar in economic size and factor endowments. The expansion
of the WTO, from 23 to 164 countries, the enlargement of the European Union, especially
after 2004, the rise of China and the emergence of global supply chains have all fostered
trade between an increasingly diverse set of countries. While all these phenomena raise the
potential gains from trade, our model shows that they may also undermine the political
support for the process of economic integration.
If an international union comprises countries that are su¢ ciently similar, it can grow
without facing any opposition. An intra-union pattern of comparative advantage due to
di¤erences in endowments, instead, increases the value of the union but also creates winners
and losers. This redistribution may undermine the support for the union even when the
country as a whole would benet from union membership. Moreover, di¤erences in economic
size implies that, in the presence of any cost of integration, larger economies would prefer a
shallow union, while smaller ones prefer deeper integration.
What policies could then be adopted to restore the support for more economic integration,
and hence to reap additional gains from trade? If disagreement over the value of the union
is between winners and losers within countries, domestic redistribution may su¢ ce to solve
it. This was clear in the theory developed here. A further complication can arise once we
relax some of the assumptions of the theory and it becomes possible that some countries lose
as a whole from further integration (relaxing the unit elasticity assumption across industries
would do this). If then the disagreement is between countries that di¤er in size and income,
solving it requires some form of international redistribution. This may be more di¢ cult to
achieve, given that such policies tend to be politically costly and hard to implement.
Alternatively, support for the union may be restored by making the union more attractive,
for instance by deepening integration in areas that are less contentious. In this paper, we
have taken the size and scope of the union as given. However, our model shows how changes
on one margin a¤ect preferences for the other. For instance, as we have already argued,
the accession of smaller and poorer countries, which want deeper integration, may trigger
a deepening of the union which may go against the desire of larger and richer countries.
Studying more formally the interaction between the size and scope of economic unions may
help shed new light on recent phenomena and seems a fruitful avenue for future research.
Finally, we cannot fail to notice that much of the political debate about European integra-
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tion, and especially about Brexit, has focused on migration. Migration features prominently
on the front pages of newspapers, in the narratives of politicians, and so on. At the same
time, we cannot fail to notice either that migration ows within Europe are small relative to
trade ows. According to Eurostat demography gures, out of 512 millions residents of the
European Union in 2017, only 22 million (4.3%) were non-EU citizens and only 17 million
(3.3%) were EU citizens living in a country other than their country of citizenship. These
are very small numbers.18 Instead, intra-EU trade in goods (19.6%) and services (7.4%) add
up to 27% of the total GDP of the European Union. These are not small numbers. Clearly
we still live in a world in which trade in goods and services is quantitatively more important
than migration.
These two observations jointly create a puzzle. Why does migration attract so much
attention in the political debate and in the media, despite being such a small phenomenon in
the European Union? Perhaps politicians and journalists simply blow up the issue of migra-
tion out of proportion to its true welfare impact. Supporting this view, in our regressions we
do not nd that migration ows predict support for the European Union across countries.
However, this negative result might just reect a limitation of our empirical specications.
Therefore, we cannot totally discard the alternative that small migration ows may have
large welfare e¤ects. One possibility is that these large welfare e¤ects are of a non-economic
nature. Assessing this hypothesis would require a very di¤erent modeling framework than
the one we o¤ered here.
Another possibility, closer to our analysis, is that migration ows have more controversial
economic consequences than trade ows of a similar magnitude. Although we have written
a classic model of international trade without factor mobility, our setup suggests one reason
why this could be the case. Trade in factors is as e¤ective as trade in goods at reaping the
gains from inter-industry trade. But those are precisely the gains that we have shown to be
associated with acute distributive tensions. Trade in goods also delivers gains from intra-
industry trade that are universally shared. Trade in factors cannot do that. When workers
move from one country to another, they can reduce the di¤erences in factor endowments
between the two countries. However, the varieties these workers produce cannot be consumed
by both countries simultaneously.
18In comparison, 14.4% of the US population is foreign-born, and as many as 41.5% of Americans live
outside their state of birth.
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